Thachil, Tariq. 2017. Do Internal Migrants Divide or Unite Across Ethnic Lines? Ethnographic and Experimental Evidence from Urban India. Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science.
Despite rapid internal migration to cities across the developing world, little is known about identity formation within poor urban migrant communities. When will ethnic differences socially and politically divide poor migrants in the city? And when will ascriptive differences be obscured by shared class identities? I study these crucial questions through six months of ethnographic fieldwork and a large-scale vignette-experiment (N=3018) conducted among internal migrants in urban India. Intra-class ethnic divisions prove highly salient in interactions exclusively between poor migrants, but irrelevant in interactions that also include urban elites. I introduce a new mechanism to explain this variation: a solidarity effect produced by city elites who perceive and treat migrants of different ethnicities in shared class terms. Elite behavior stems from the concentration of poor migrants into ethnically heterogeneous, economically homogeneous urban worksites and settlements. Such concentration reverses the visibility advantage ethnicity enjoys over class in villages structured along ethnic lines.
Thachil, Tariq (first author), and Emmanuel Teitelbaum. 2015. "Ethnic Parties and Public Spending: New Theory in Evidence from the Indian States." Comparative Political Studies, 48, 11 (September): 1389-1420.
Social scientists largely see ethnic politics as inhibiting public goods provisioning within developing democracies. Such parties are thought to uniformly rely on distributing excludable benefits to co-ethnics, rather than on providing public goods to all. We argue that ethnic parties can vary substantially in how they mobilize support and behave in office. Much of this variation depends on the breadth of the identity they activate. Although “narrow” ethnic parties do indeed entrench patronage politics, the rise of more “encompassing” ethnic parties can actually improve levels of voter autonomy, expand the effective size of winning coalitions, and increase spending on broadly available public goods. We develop and test this argument with evidence from the Indian states, including a nationally representative survey of 20,000 Indian voters and a panel data set of 15 major states over four decades.
Why do poor people often vote against their material interests? This article extends the study of this global paradox to the non-Western world by considering how it manifests within India, the world’s biggest democracy. Arguments derived from studies of advanced democracies (such as values voting) or of poor polities (such as patronage and ethnic appeals) fail to explain this important phenomenon. Instead, I outline a novel strategy predicated on an electoral division of labor enabling elite parties to recruit the poor while retaining the rich. Recruitment is outsourced to nonparty affiliates that provide basic services to appeal to poor communities. Such outsourcing permits the party to maintain programmatic linkages to its elite core. Empirically, I test this argument with qualitative and quantitative evidence, including a survey of more than 9,000 voters. Theoretically, I argue that this approach is best suited to elite parties with thick organizations, typically those linked to religious social movements.
Thachil, Tariq. 2011. “Embedded Mobilization: Nonstate Service Provision as Electoral Strategy in India.” World Politics, 63 (July): 434-469. Featured in the Wall Street Journal’s India Real Time blog and Business Standard.
Despite growing interest in the potential electoral impact of private service provision by religious parties, there is a paucity of systematic empirical research on the subject. Can a welfare-based strategy win votes? If so, is this tactic best conceptualized as a purely material exchange of services for votes? This study provides a conceptualization of private service provision as an electoral strategy that is distinct from both programmatic politics as well as clientelist vote-buying. I argue that service provision mobilizes direct beneficiaries for material reasons, but unlike vote-buying also mobilizes many non-beneficiaries in the localities where providers work. Unlike episodic and transactional vote-buying, the daily act of service provisioning embeds providers within communities. Such 'embedded' activists are able to mobilize non-beneficiary support through a number of channels, from recruiting effective local candidates and workers to influencing voters through social networks, and the use of rumor and suggestion. I support these arguments with evidence from religious welfare undertaken by Hindu nationalists in central India.
Thachil, Tariq. 2009. “Neoliberalism’s Two Faces in Asia: Globalization, Educational Policies, and Religious Schooling in India, Pakistan and Malaysia.” Comparative Politics, 41 (July): 473-494.
Why do Southern Asian economies implementing similar market reforms exhibit dramatically different commitments to spending on education? What are the political consequences of such differences? Drawing of a comparison of India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, I argue varying structures of domestic support explain these differences. The development of a vertical patronage-based political system in India and Pakistan has created incentives for policymakers to be more concerned with ensuring continued patronage flows to their elite supporters during reforms. Consequently South Asian politicians have adopted the rhetoric of advocates of privatization and interpret neoliberalism as justifying the 'retreat of the state' in social policy arenas. By contrast, Malaysian politicians relying on horizontal support from poor ethnic Malays has had stronger incentives to expand educational provision to allow its supporters to compete for jobs in the deregulated economy with wealthier ethnic Chinese and Indians. It has accordingly espoused a different discourse regarding states and markets, stressing the government's responsibility for preparing its citizens for the conditions of the global marketplace.
Thachil, Tariq (first author), and Ronald Herring. 2008. “Poor Choices: dealignment, development and Dalit/Adivasi voting patterns in Indian states.” Contemporary South Asia, 16 (December): 441-64.
Lower caste and tribal communities are by no means the homogeneous voting block portrayed in many electoral analyses of Indian politics, and consistently undermine the popular conceptualization of Indian electoral and party behavior as identity-based or ethnic. Instead, recent electoral surveys confirm a growing trend for these disadvantaged populations to vote for radically dissimilar parties across different states—from the Communist Party of India (Marxist), to the Congress, to the Bahujan Samaj Party, or indeed to the BJP itself—driven by plausible calculation of interests. Using national election data from the 1999 and 2004 elections, this paper examines the theoretical puzzle this divergent electoral behavior presents to both the comparative literature on cleavage-based party systems and the scholarship on caste and identity politics in India. We argue that at least some of this variance can be explained by the fact that differences in state-level conditions influence which of the array of strategies used by Indian parties to recruit Dalit and Adivasi voters is likely to be successful.
Heightened police repression is an important feature of urban life for poor migrants in the developing world. Yet little is known about how police repression shapes patterns of cooperation and conflict within these proliferating urban communities. I address this question by combining 5 months of ethnographic fieldwork with an original large-scale survey experiment conducted among poor migrants (N=2400) in urban India. Far from fracturing poor migrant communities, I find repression increases rates of political and economic cooperation within them. These solidarity effects stem from both empathy and self-interest, and are rooted in shared experiences of repression. Strikingly, they can even extend across inter-migrant economic and ethnic rivalries. My findings reveal repression to be a novel and neglected pathway of migrant identity formation in the developing world. More broadly, this study extends research on how repression shapes mass protest to consider how it impacts everyday relations between frequently repressed citizens.
Thachil, Tariq and Adam Auerbach. 2015. Co-Ethnicity, Capability, or Connectivity? The Origins of Political Brokerage in India's Urban Slums
How do the political brokers essential to clientelistic politics emerge? Political brokers operate in an informal space between citizens and the state in which they facilitate the exchange of electoral support for access to goods, services, and protection. Studies of political clientelism largely take these actors as a static given and cannot address how they initially build the following of voters that make them attractive to political elites. We address this question through a study of a pervasive broker across cities in the developing world—informal slum leaders. To identify the citizen preferences that guide slum leader selection, we conducted an ethnographically informed conjoint survey experiment with 2,194 residents across 110 slum settlements in two north Indian cities. Our analysis finds that shared ethnicity—the overwhelming focus of contemporary scholarship on political selection in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa—is often trumped by non-ethnic indicators of a broker’s connectivity to urban bureaucracies and capacity to make claims on the state. These findings shed important light on the origins of patron-client hierarchies and the political changes engendered by rapid urbanization across the developing world.
Thachil, Tariq. 2015. Improving Surveys Through Ethnography: Insights from India's Urban Periphery (Under review).
Survey-based research on political behavior in the developing world faces challenges in accessing important populations, particularly those marked by high rates of mobility and informality. The growing use of cognitively demanding experimental questions also heightens construct validity concerns for surveys administered to poorly educated populations. I argue that ethnographic fieldwork can help researchers address these twin challenges of access and construct validity. I substantiate these arguments with data and insights from fifteen months of fieldwork among an especially challenging population: circular urban migrants in India. First, I show how ethnography can help design context-sensitive sampling strategies that mitigate concerns of inadequate coverage, high non-response, and inefficiency. In my study, ethnographic insights inspired a unique sampling protocol that accessed circular migrants at urban worksites instead of residences. Second, I show how ethnography can be used to improve the construct validity of survey instruments, particularly survey experiments. I illustrate this potential by outlining how fieldwork informed the construction of experimental vignettes that more effectively translated abstract theoretical concepts into the specific experiences of my respondents. Finally, I show how ethnographic innovations such as worksite sampling and ethnographic vignette-experiments can be applied beyond the study population that inspired them. Sustained qualitative fieldwork can thus significantly boost survey-based research on political behavior in hitherto neglected pockets of the developing world.